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HEALTH LAw SURVEY
INTRODUCTION

The nation's health care system has recently undergone unprecedented scrutiny. Politicians from the White House to Capitol Hill, health
care professionals and experts, policymakers, and the general public agree
that at some level the present health care system needs to change. Of
course, determining the extent of such a change prompts a highly political, ideological, and even emotional debate. Court decisions that interpret and apply health laws expose important health care issues and
problems. Consequently, these decisions facilitate reform by guiding law
and policymakers to problem areas within the health care system. Therefore, current health law cases warrant investigation.
Over the past year, the Tenth Circuit ruled on numerous health-related issues. Several of these rulings undoubtedly will impact the health
care system. This Survey discusses three notable Tenth Circuit cases concerning issues in health law arising under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTAIA), 1 the Medicare Act,2 and § 510 of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).3 Part I considers4
the issues of patient stabilization and physician liability under EMTALA.
Part II analyzes the issue of "Sole Community Hospital" status under the
Medicare Act. 5 Finally, part III discusses the issue of health benefit dis6
crimination under ERISA.
I.

EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT AND
7

AcrvE LABOR ACT:

DE AEY v. C.DE

A.

Background
1. Stabilization of an Emergency Medical Condition

EMTALA primarily functions to prevent private hospital emergency
rooms from transferring and denying available medical care to patients
who cannot afford to pay for treatment, a phenomenon known as "patient
dumping."8 Participating Medicare hospitals with emergency rooms must
sufficiently examine the patient to determine whether an "emergency
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988).
4. See infra part I discussing Delaney v. Cade, 986 F.2d 387 (10th Cir. 1993).
5. See infra part II discussing Community Hosp. v. Sullivan, 986 F.2d 357 (10th Cir.
1993).
6. See infra part III discussing Phelps v. Field Real Estate Co., 991 F.2d 645 (10th Cir.
1993).
7. Delaney, 986 F.2d at 387.
8. Diana K. Falstrom, Comment, Decisions Under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act: A Judicial Curefor PatientDumping, 19 N. Ky. L. REv. 365, 365 (1992); John P.
Halfpenny, Comment, Taking Aim at Hospital "Dumping"of Emergency Department Patients: The
COBRA Strikes Back, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 693, 693-94 (1991).
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medical condition" 9 exists. 10 If such an emergency situation does exist,
then the hospital is obligated under the act to either provide treatment or
to transfer the patient."1 Transfer is permitted only if the patient has requested transfer after being fully informed of the risks, the physician has
certified in writing (either directly or by countersignature) that the benefits of transfer outweigh the risks, or the patient has stabilized. 12 One issue addressed in Delaney v. Cade concerned whether the plaintiffs
13
condition was indeed stabilized prior to her transfer.
Several courts have addressed the issue of a patient's stabilization
under EMTALA. The Tenth Circuit found the following cases relevant to
Delaney: Deberry v. Sherman HospitalAss'n, 14 Burditt v. United States Department
16
15
of Health & Human Services, and Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group.
In Deberry, the plaintiff claimed that her daughter had not been properly
stabilized before being discharged from the defendant hospital. 17 Denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, 18 the district court noted that hospital violations of EMTALA occur in one of two ways. 19 First, if an
emergency medical condition does exist, the hospital can violate the act by
20
failing to determine "the nature of the [patient's] emergency condition."
Second, if the nature of the emergency condition is discovered, the hospital
can violate the act by transferring or releasing the patient without stabilizing the patient's condition.2 1 The court concluded that an inquiry into
the occurrence of either violation requires a factual determination,
22
thereby rendering dismissal inappropriate.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e) (1) (Supp. III 1991).
"Emergency medical condition" is defined as:
(A) a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity
(including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention could
reasonably be expected to result in(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect to a pregnant woman, the health of the woman or her unborn child) in serious jeopardy,
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or
(iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part; or
(B) with respect to a pregnant women [sic] who is having contractions(i) that there is inadequate time to effect a safe transfer to another hospital
before delivery, or
(ii) that transfer may pose a threat to the health or safety of the woman of the
unborn child.
Id.
10. Falstrom, supra note 8, at 369-70.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 370-72. "The term 'stabilized' means, with respect to an emergency medical
condition . . . that no material deterioration of the condition is likely, within reasonable
medical probability, to result from or occur during the transfer of the individual from a
facility, or . .. that the woman has delivered ... ." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e) (3) (B)
(Supp. III 1989-1992)).
13. See Delaney, 986 F.2d at 391-93.
14. 741 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
15. 934 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1991).
16. 917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990).
17. Deberry, 741 F. Supp. at 1303.
18. Id. at 1307.
19. Id. at 1305.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1305.
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In Burditt, the defendant doctor appealed the imposition of civil monetary penalties against him for failing, among other things, to properly
stabilize a patient before her transfer. 23 The Fifth Circuit held that Dr.
Burditt failed to properly stabilize the patient because he did not provide
the treatment that medical experts would normally provide to prevent the
potentially adverse consequences to the patient. 24 As in Debery, the Burditt
court determined the question of patient stabilization by considering facts,
In Cleland, the plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their claim that the
defendants failed to stabilize the patient's condition. 25 Upholding the dismissal, the Sixth Circuit found that the patient could be considered stabilized within the meaning of EMTALA because the patient was not acutely
distressed and neither the doctors, the patient's parents, nor the patient
himself indicated a deteriorating condition. 2 6 In other words, the doctors
had no occasion to detect the patient's state of emergency. 27 Hence, the
court reconciled its decision with Deberry by stating, "[ilf the emergency
nature of the condition is not detected, the hospital cannot be charged
28
with failure to stabilize a known emergency condition."
2.

Enforcement Against Hospitals and Physicians

29
EMTALA also provides three enforcement mechanisms:

(1) civil

monetary penalties against hospitals or doctors who negligently violate the
act;3 0 (2) private civil suits against hospitals whose violations directly cause
personal injury;3 ' and, (3) suspension or revocation of a hospital's Medicare provider agreement.3 2 Contrary to the language of § 1395dd(d) (1)
imposing civil monetary penalties, § 1395dd(d) (2) (A) allowing for private
civil suits only specifies the participating hospital as the object of the
suit.3 3 Nevertheless, the issue of a doctor's civil suit liability under the act
23. Burditt, 934 F.2d at 1366, 1368-69.
24. Id. at 1369.

25. Cleland 917 F.2d at 269.
26. Id. at 271.
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. See Halfpenny, supra note 8, at 704-05.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1) (Supp. III 1991) provides:
(A) A participating hospital that negligently violates a requirement of this section is
subject to a civil monetary penalty of not more than $50,000 . . . for each such
violation.
(B) Subject to subparagraph (C), any physician who is responsible for the examination, treatment, or transfer of an individual in a participating hospital, including a
physician on-call for the care of such an individual, and who negligently violates...
this section ....
is subject to a civil monetary penalty of not more than $50,000 for
each such violation ....
31. Id. § 1395dd(d) (2) (A) (emphasis added) provides:
Any individual who suffers personal harm as a direct result of a participating hospital's violation of a requirement of this section may, in a civil action against the participatinghospita obtain those damages available for personal injury under the law of
the State in which the hospital is located, and such equitable relief as is appropriate.
32. Id. § 1395dd(d) (2) (A) (violating physicians may be excluded from Medicare and
state health care programs).
33. Falstrom, supra note 8, at 378; see also Case Comment, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 355,
356 (1993) (EMTALA creates a private cause of action against hospitals but not against doctors). Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1) (Supp. III 1991) with § 1395dd(d) (2) (A).
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has been the source of litigation.3 4 The Tenth Circuit considered this is35
sue in Delaney.
The leading case on this issue is Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America.3 6 In
Baber, the plaintiff sued the physicians for allegedly violating EMTALA by
inadequately addressing his sister's emergency medical condition.3 7 The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant physicians.3 8 The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that EMTALA does not provide for private civil suits against physicians. 3 9 The Fourth Circuit further
explained that only the Department of Health and Human Services can
bring an action against a physician to impose administrative civil monetary
penalties and/or to prohibit the physician's involvement in Medicare programs. 40 The court based its decision on its failure to find contrary con41
gressional intent in EMTALA's legislative history.
42
The plaintiff argued against summary judgment based on Burditt
and Sorrells v. Babcock.43 Yet, the Fourth Circuit found neither case persuasive. 44 Burditt involved a doctor's appeal from the assessment of administrative civil monetary penalties by the Department of Health and
Human Services, not a private civil suit against a physician. 45 The court in
Sorrells merely held that the federal courts have jurisdiction over EMTALA
actions against emergency room physicians. 46 While the Sorrells court
questioned Congress' intent behind allowing the Secretary to recover
47
monetary penalties in cases where a patient brought the suit, the Fourth

Circuit considered the Sorrells analysis to be mere dictum, and illustrative
48
of the court's confusion of the issues.
34. See Falstrom, supra note 8, at 384; see also Robert A. Bitterman, Note, A CriticalAnalysis of the Federal COBRA Hospital "AntidumpingLaw": Ramifications for Hospitals, Physicians, and
Effects on Access to Healthcare,70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 125, 172-73 (1992) (discussing cases
that have addressed the civil liability of physicians under EMTALA).
35. See Delaney, 986 F.2d at 393-94.
36. 977 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1992).
37. Id. at 874.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 876-77. Several federal district courts agree on this issue. See Jones v. Wake
County Hosp. Sys., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 538, 545 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (COBRA does not provide a
private cause of action against a physician); Lavignette v. West Jefferson Medical Ctr., No.
CIV.A.89-5495, 1990 WL 178708, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 7, 1990) (holding the express language
and legislative history of EMTALA indicate it was not intended to provide a private cause of
action against physicians); Verhagen v. Olarte, No. 89CIV.0300(CSH), 1989 WL 146265, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1989) (construing EMTALA as excluding a federal private claim against a
physician).
40. Baber, 977 F.2d at 877.
41. See id.; H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 6-7 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 726, 728.
42. 934 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1991).
43. 733 F. Supp. 1189 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
44. See Baber, 977 F.2d at 877; see also Case Comment, supra note 33, at 358 (explaining
the Baber court's distinction of Burditt and Sorrelts).
45. Id. at 877-78; see Burditt, 934 F.2d at 1366.
46. Baber, at 878; see Sorrells, 733 F.Supp at 1195.
47. Baber, 977 F.2d at 878; see Sorrells, 733 F. Supp. at 1194.
48. See Baber, 977 F.2d at 878. But see Bitterman, supra note 35, at 172 (citing Sorrells as
authority for holding physicians liable in private civil suits); Falstrom, supra note 8, at 384.

1994]
B.

HEALTH LAW

985

49
Tenth Circuit Decision: Delaney v. Cade

1. Facts
The plaintiff, Ms. Delaney, sustained serious injuries in an automobile
accident. 50 Her injuries included a transected aorta, face and knee lacerations, arm and neck fractures, and a broken nose. 51 The emergency room
at St. Joseph Memorial Hospital (St. Joseph) received Ms. Delaney immediately following the accident. 5 2 While at St. Joseph, the defendant, Dr.
Cade, treated only her knee injuries; he neither ordered x-rays nor performed a physical examination. 53 At that time, Ms. Delaney still had feeling in her legs and she complained of chest pains. 54 Two hours after her
arrival at St. Joseph, Dr. Cade transferred her to Central Kansas Medical
Center (Central). 55 By the time she arrived at Central, the feeling in her
legs had disappeared. 5 6 Ms. Delaney received further medical treatment
at Central before being transferred again to the University of Kansas Medical Center (K.U.). 57 At K.U., doctors discovered Ms. Delaney's clotted
transected aorta. 58 They performed surgery, but Ms. Delaney remained
59
permanently paralyzed.
Ms. Delaney sued Dr. Cade, St. Joseph, and Central under § 1395dd
60
of EMTALA for failing to stabilize her condition prior to her transfer.
The district court concluded that the facts alleged did not support a claim
against either hospital and thus granted those defendants full summary
judgment. 61 The district court also found that EMTALA does not allow
private civil suits against physicians; therefore, the court granted Dr. Cade
partial summary judgment on that issue. 62 Ms. Delaney appealed these
judgments. 63 The Tenth Circuit reversed in part, holding that the evidence may support a claim against the hospitals under § 1395dd, but affirmed the lower court's grant of partial summary judgment for Dr.
64
Cade.
2.

Opinion

The Tenth Circuit first addressed whether Ms. Delaney's condition
had been stabilized before she was moved to Central. The court cited
49.

986 F.2d 387 (10th Cir. 1993).

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

388.
388 n.1.
388.
388-89.
388-89.
389.

388.
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Debery v. Sherman Hospital Ass'n 65 for the rule that hospitals can violate
§ 1395dd of EMTALA by failing to stabilize a patient's emergency medical
condition before the patient is released or transferred. 66 The court held,
based on Deberry, that all expert testimony introduced on the summary
judgment issue must be considered to determine whether a material deterioration of the plaintiffs condition was likely during the transfer (that is,
whether the defendant hospitals properly stabilized Ms. Delaney).67 Ms.
Delaney disputed the district court's finding that she had conceded the
stabilization issue. 68 Furthermore, Ms. Delaney alleged that the feeling
she had in her legs before transfer had dissipated by the time she arrived
at Central-a material deterioration of her condition during the transfer. 69 Considering these allegations, the court found that the evidence
offered by Ms. Delaney presented a genuine issue of material fact concernthen reversed the suming the stabilization of her condition. 70 The court
71
mary judgment for the hospitals on that issue.
The Tenth Circuit next considered the issue of a physician's civil liability under § 1395dd of EMTALA. 72 The court followed Baber and the
statute's language in holding that § 1395dd does not allow individuals to
bring civil suits against physicians who allegedly violate the act, but that
individuals can bring civil suits against an offending hospital. 73 Thus, the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment for the de74
fendant doctor.
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit properly followed other decisions that applied a
fact-based analysis to the issue of patient stabilization. 75 The definition of
"stabilized" is sufficiently vague to require significant fact-finding and
weighing of evidence. 76 Congress may have intended to be unspecific in
its definition. However, more specificity and clarity in the definition of
"stabilized" would provide a useful guide for the fact-finding process.
Given the present definition and the circumstances of Ms. Delaney's case,
the Tenth Circuit correctly left the question open for an adversarial consideration of the alleged facts. Ruling one way or the other as a matter of
65. 741 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
66. Delaney, 986 F.2d at 391-92.
67. Id. at 392. For definition of "stabilized" see supra note 12.
68. Delaney, 986 F.2d at 392-93.

69. See id. at 393.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.

72. See id.
73. Delaney, 986 F.2d at 393-94.
74. Id. at 394.
75. See, e.g., Burditt v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Serv.'s, 934 F.2d 1362,
1369 (5th Cir. 1991) (stabilization question depended upon testimony by medical experts);
Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, 917 F.2d 266, 271 (6th Cir. 1990) (held to be stabilized because no facts indicating otherwise); Deberry v. Sherman Hosp. Ass'n, 741 F. Supp.
1302, 1305 (N.D. Il. 1990) (definition of"to stabilize" is obviously factual question). See supra
notes 13-27 and accompanying text (discussing these cases more fully).
76. See definition of "stabilized" supra note 12.
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law on this issue when an actual factual dispute exists would accomplish
nothing. The Tenth Circuit's decision may influence other courts to resist
ruling on similar issues before trial.
On the issue of a physician's civil liability under EMTALA, the court
properly held that no such liability exists based on the actual language of
the statute and on other court decisions. 77 It does seem anomalous, however, that both negligent hospitals and negligent doctors may incur administrative monetary penalties, but only negligent participating hospitals
may be sued by private individuals. 78 Even though a hospital may be appropriately considered vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its physicians, it is usually an individual physician who makes the medical
decisions, examines or fails to examine the patient, and provides or fails to
provide the treatment.
The legislative history fails to directly address the reason for immunizing physicians from private civil liability, but the Judiciary Committee expressed its concern that overly severe penalties might defeat the goal of
the act to increase availability of emergency care, thereby leading some
hospitals to close their emergency rooms to avoid penalty risks. 79 In addition, the committee expressed concern that more severe penalties might
exacerbate the medical malpractice crisis.80 The Judiciary Committee believed the present penalties constituted a sufficient deterrent against
emergency room abuses.8 1 Perhaps the committee also felt that creating a
private cause of action against physicians under the act would be superfluous in light of common law malpractice suits.
To make the act's penalty provisions more consistent, Congress could
allow for limited physician civil liability. For example, Congress could cap
the amount of available damages. Congress could also require the aggrieved patient to choose between suing the physician under the act, or
suing the physician under a common law action. While congressional concerns about the potentially adverse effects of imposing overly harsh penalties are certainly understandable, allowing an injured patient some level of
personal redress through the act, even if limited, should accomplish the
goals of the act, yet dodge adverse repercussions.

77. See, e.g., Jones v. Wake County Hosp. Sys., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 538, 545 (E.D.N.C.
1991) (COBRA does not provide a private cause of action against a physician); Lavignette v.
West Jefferson Medical Ctr., No. CIV.A.89-5495, 1990 WL 178708, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 7,
1990) (holding the express language and legislative history of EMTALA indicate it was not
intended to provide a private cause of action against physicians); Verhagen v. Olarte, No.
89CIV.0300(CSH), 1989 WL 146265, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1989) (construing EMTALA as
excluding a federal private claim against a physician).
78.

See supra part I.A.2.

79. See H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 726, 728.
80. Id.

81. Id. at 7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 726, 729.
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8 2

Background

Originally, the Medicare Act provided reimbursement to participating
83
hospitals for the "reasonable cost" of care given to Medicare recipients.
In 1983, Congress changed the system by replacing the "reasonable cost"
system with the "prospective payment system" (PPS). 84 The PPS paid set
amounts to hospitals based on the diagnoses of patients. 8 5 Congress
hoped this new system would encourage hospital efficiency by rewarding
cost-efficient services. 86 However, because smaller rural hospitals are
often less efficient than larger urban medical centers, these rural hospitals
received disproportionately fewer Medicare reimbursements than their urban counterparts. 87 In response to this adverse effect, Congress allowed
"sole community hospitals"
certain rural hospitals, those defined as
88
(SCHs), to receive more Medicare funds.
Congress originally defined SCH in fairly general terms. 89 In 1989
Congress narrowed the definition by requiring, among other things, that
SCHs be more than 35 miles from other hospitals or that SCHs be the only

90
The
source of hospital services due to a lack of "other like hospitals."
91
definition.
former
the
in
exist
not
did
hospitals"
phrase "like
Pursuant to the authority granted in the statute, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services promulgated corresponding administrative
regulations concerning SCH status. 92 The regulations define "like hospital" as one providing "short-term acute care." 93 In addition, the regulations state that hospitals with SCH status under the original system would

82. 986 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1993).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (1982) (amended 1983); see id. at 358;.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d) (1988) (amended 1989); see Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 358;
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d) (1988); see Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 358.
86. H.R. REP. No. 25, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 132 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N.
219, 351; see Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 358.
87. Robin E. Margolis, Healthtrends, HFALTHSPAN, May 1992, at 21.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d) (5) (c)(ii) (1988); see id.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d) (5) (C) (ii) (1988) (amended 1989) provided:
[T] he term "sole community hospital" means a hospital that, by reason of factors
such as isolated location, weather conditions, travel conditions, or absence of other
hospitals (as determined by the Secretary), is the sole source of inpatient hospital
services reasonably available to individuals in a geographical area who are entitled
to benefits under part A of this subchapter.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d) (5) (D) (iii) (Supp. III 1991) (emphasis added) provides:
[An SCH is] any hospital(l) that the Secretary determines is located more than 35
road miles from another hospital, (II) that, by reason of factors such as the time
required for an individual to travel to the nearest alternative source of appropriate
inpatient care ... , location, weather conditions, travel conditions, or absence of
other like hospitals (as determined by the Secretary), is the sole source of inpatient
hospital services reasonably available to individuals in a geographic area who are
entitled to benefits under part A of this subchapter, or (III) that is designated by the
Secretary as an essential access community hospital ....
91. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d) (5) (C) (ii) (1988) (amended 1989).
92. 42 C.F.R. § 412.92 (1990).
93. Id. § 412.92(c) (2).
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not be required to meet the new standards, 9 4 and SCH status would not be
revoked unless the conditions surrounding the conferral of the status
95
changed.
In St. Mary's Hospital & Medical Center v. Heckler (St. Mary's),96 the district court found that St. Mary's Hospital qualified as a SCH because
nearby Community Hospital, unlike St. Mary's Hospital, provided limited
osteopathic97 care; St. Mary's Hospital provided more extensive allopathic98
care. 99 This difference in treatment methodologies distinguished the two
hospitals sufficiently enough to permit SCH status for St. Mary's Hospital. 100 Based on the reasoning of the St. Mary's case, Community Hospital
also applied for SCH status, resulting in the recent Tenth Circuit
decision.101

B.

Tenth Circuit Decision: Community Hospital v. Sullivan
1.

Facts

Community Hospitalv. Sullivan involved the same two hospitals as in St.
Mary's Hospital & Medical Center v. Heckler.10 2 Community Hospital (Community) provides short-term, acute osteopathic10 3 care in Grand Junction,
Colorado. 10 4 The nearest osteopathic hospital is located 500 miles away in
Albuquerque, New Mexico. 10 5 However, St. Mary's Health Center (St.
Mary's), a short-term, acute allopathic 10 6 care hospital, is located only a
few blocks away from Community. 10 7 In addition, St. Mary's has SCH status under an obsolete statutory and regulatory procedure. 108 The basis
94. Id. § 412.92(b) (5) provides:
A hospital that has been granted an exemption from the hospital cost limits under
§ 413.30(e)(1) of this chapter before October 1, 1983, or whose request for the
exemption was received by the appropriate intermediary before October 1, 1983,
and was subsequently approved, will be automatically classified as a [SCH] unless
that classification has been canceled under paragraph (b)(3) of this section, or
there is a change in the circumstances under which the classification was approved.
95. Id. § 412.92(b)(3) provides, "An approved classification as a [SCH] will remain in
effect without need for reapproval unless there is a change in the circumstances under which
the classification was approved."
96. No. CIV.84-Z-1474, 1985 WL 56559 (D. Colo. Feb. 7, 1985).
97. Osteopathy is "[a] school of medicine based upon the idea that the normal body
when in 'correct adjustment' is a vital machine capable of making its own remedies against
infections and other toxic conditions. Practitioners use the diagnostic and therapeutic measures of ordinary medicine in addition to manipulative measures." STrEDMN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1004 (5th unabr. lawyer's ed. 1982). Practitioners are doctors of medicine.
Community Hosp. v. Sullivan, 986 F.2d 357, 362 n.2 (10th Cir. 1993).
98. Allopathy is "substitutive therapy; a therapeutic system in which a disease is treated
by producing a second condition that is incompatible with or antagonistic to the first." Id. at
44.
99. St. Mary's, 1985 WL 56559 at *1; see Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 359.
100. St Mary's, 1985 WL 56559 at *1-2.
101. See Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 359.
102. Id.
103. See supra note 97 (definition of osteopathic).
104. Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 359.
105. Id.
106. See supra note 98 (definition of allopathic).
107. Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 359.
108. See id.; St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr. v. Heckler, No. CIV.84-Z-1474, 1985 WL
56559 at *1. The St. May's case was decided before the current statutes and regulations went
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for St. Mary's SCH status arose from the fact that Community provided
only osteopathic care with limited services, (that is, no intensive care, therapeutic radiology, or emergency department), while St. Mary's provided
allopathic care.' 0 9
Relying on the St. Mary's decision and the 500-mile distance between
Community and the nearest osteopathic hospital, Community applied for
SCH status in 1990.110 The Secretary of Health and Human Services refused to grant SCH status to Community on the grounds that Community
and St. Mary's fit the definition of "like hospitals.""1 On appeal, the district court relied on the St. Mary's decision, reversed the Secretary's ruling,
and ordered the Secretary to grant Community SCH status. 1 2 The Secre3
tary appealed to the Tenth Circuit."
2.

Opinion

The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. 1 4 The court
applied a standard of review deferential to the Secretary's findings and
quickly dispensed with Community's first two arguments: collateral estoppel and inappropriate deference to the Secretary's interpretation.' 1 5 The
court held that the Secretary was not collaterally estopped from raising the
"like hospitals" issue because the facts and law had significantly changed
from those existing at the time of the St. Mary's decision."16 Specifically,
Community's services had changed, as had the statutory and regulatory
procedure. 1 17 On the issue of inappropriate deference to the Secretary's
interpretation, the court ruled that deference to the Secretary was appropriate for two reasons: (1) Congress explicitly granted the Secretary the
authority to administer the statute, and (2) the Secretary reasonably inter118
preted it.
The third and primary substantive issue in the case involved the
proper interpretation of the regulatory definition of "like hospitals.""19
Community first argued that the Secretary's interpretation of the phrase
conflicted with congressional intent by creating an unfair economic imbalance between the two fundamentally different hospitals.' 20 Community
further argued that the administrative regulations permitting the Secretary to revoke the SCH status of grandfathered hospitals due to changed
circumstances 121 conflicted with the "like hospitals" regulation. 12 2 Specifiinto effect. See Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 360. See also supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
109. Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 359; see St. Mary's, 1985 WL 56559 at *1.
110. Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 359.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 358.
114. Id. at 360.
115. Id. at 360.
116. Id. See supranotes 95-100 and accompanying text (discussing the St. Mary's decision).
117. Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 360.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 361; 42 C.F.R § 412.92(c) (2) (1990).
120. See Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 361.
121. See42 C.F.R. § 412.92(b) (3), (5) (1990); supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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cally, Community asked how the Secretary could deny Community SCH
status on the basis of changed circumstances while simultaneously allowing St. Mary's' SCH status to continue despite the changed circumand osteopathic
stances. 123 Finally, Community argued that the allopathic
1 24
distinction made the two hospitals different by nature.
The court first held that because the statute clearly seeks to reimburse
rural hospitals that are the only available means of standardmedical care,
and not those hospitals in the same rural area that provide specialty care,
the need to analyze the statute's legislative history was eliminated.1 25 Second, the court held that the grandfather regulation 126 requiring SCH applicants such as Community to meet the present statutory and regulatory
scheme, while exempting those with prior SCH status such as St. Mary's,
did not invalidate the "like hospitals" regulation merely because a different regulatory mechanism applied to the grandfathered hospitals.' 2 7 Finally, the court held that the district court incorrectly applied the St.
Mary's decision to Community's case.1 28 The court found the osteo129
pathic/allopathic distinction irrelevant under the present regulations.
"Like hospitals," as used in the statute and defined in the regulation, include those hospitals located within 35 miles of each other that provide
130
short-term, acute care regardless of the type of care otherwise provided.
The court applied this definition and found that both hospitals provided
and thus concluded
short-term, acute care within 35 miles of each other,
13 1
that Community did not qualify for SCH status.
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision turns on the definition of "like hospitals" as defined in title 42 § 412.92 of the 1990 Code of Federal Regulations.13 2 Because a like hospital, St. Mary's, was within 35 miles of
Community, Community did not meet the requirements of the statute and
could not receive SCH status. t33 This decision seems logical and appropriate. It requires a strict application of a relatively clear statute and regulation to the facts. The court's decision does not sidestep the issue,
convolute the meaning of the statute, or boldly override the controlling
legislation. The court found the statute and definitions to be clear and
122. Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 361.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 362.
125. Id. at 361 (citing Public Hosp. Dist. No. 1 v. Sullivan, 806 F. Supp. 1478, 1485 (E.D.
Wash. 1992)). "There is no indication in the language of the statute that Congress intended
that the government subsidize specialty hospitals located in the same rural community." Id.

126. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.92(b) (5) (1990); supra note 89 and accompanying text.
127.

Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 361-62.

128. Id. at 362.
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 363.
132. 42 C.F.R. § 412.92 (1990). See supra text accompanying note 93.
133. Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 363.
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applied the law to Community's case. When the requirements for SCH
status were not met, the court properly denied Community that status.
Nevertheless, the result is troublesome. Because Community is an osteopathic hospital and St. Mary's is an allopathic hospital, the two hospitals provide fundamentally different approachesto acute medical care, not
different specialties.'5 4 Therefore, patients who prefer one approach over
the other are limited to one such hospital within a 35-mile radius. The
Tenth Circuit's decision sets a precedent that two hospitals are "like hospitals" regardless of the fact that they provide two completely different types
of acute care. Because the court's decision turned primarily on the definition of "like hospitals," that definition should be narrowed to prevent "unlike" hospitals from being considered "like." This would permit patients
to chose the type of short term acute care they desire. A narrower definition is also consistent with Congress' goal in granting SHC status to prevent additional charges from being passed on to the patients who have no
opportunity to use a less expensive hospital if only one hospital is in the
community and if Medicare reimbursement is limited.' 3 5 Patients in
Grand Junction, Colorado who wish to undergo osteopathic care are denied this opportunity to shop around.
Furthermore, this decision leaves Community economically disadvantaged compared to St. Mary's. With the SCH reimbursements, St. Mary's
may be more cost competitive than Community and ultimately cause Community's closure. Such a result conforms neither to Congress' apparent
intent (to reimburse less efficient rural hospitals so they can remain open)
nor to the needs of rural communities (availabilty of medical care).
Even though the court's decision seems unfair, the court may have
had little choice. Given the clear statutory and regulatory definitions, the
decision for Community may have set a snowballing precedent. Most rural
hospitals, if not all, would be able to ride on the coattails of grandfathered
hospitals and gain SCH status,1 3 6 effectively rendering the new regulations
useless. Moreover, as Community implicitly argued, the changes in Community's medical services and the changes in the law itself strongly suggest
that St. Mary's' SCH status should be revoked.1 3 7 Therefore, to avoid similar inequitable results in the future, either the statute and regulations
need to be further amended or the agency responsible for determining
SCH status should do its job and revoke unnecessary grants.

134. For definitions of osteopathy and allopathy, see supra notes 97-98; see also Community
Hosp., 986 F.2d at 362 n.2 (distinguishing the practices of osteopathic and allopathic

medicine).
135. Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 361.
136. See Community Hosp., 986 F.2d at 361.
137. See id. at 361.
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Background

Congress enacted ERISA13 9 as a means of uniformly regulating private. employee benefit programs. 140 ERISA applies to both pension and
welfare or health benefit plans. 14 1 This statute serves as a guide for pri14 2
vate, self-insured employers to determine their employees' benefits.
Section 510 of ERISA forbids both employer discrimination against, or discharge of, employees who rightfully file benefit claims, and further forbids
employer interference with employees' rights to receive benefits under a
benefit plan. 143 In other words, the statute prohibits discrimination or
discharge not only for actually filing a benefit claim, but also for the
144
probability or possibility of filing a claim.
As suggested above, ERISA cases usually follow one of two scenarios:
(1) the employer discharges the employee, supposedly for a legitimate reason, but the employee alleges that the employee's effect, or expected effect, on benefit costs actually motivated the discharge; or (2) the employee
plan
claims that the employer changed or stopped the employee's benefit
146
to conserve costs. 14 5 Phelps involved the first of these scenarios.
In discharge cases, the employee must generally show three elements:
(1) the employer engaged in prohibited conduct; (2) to interfere, (3) with
the employee's right to receive benefits. 147 If the employer masks the motive with a legitimate reason for the discharge, however, the employee's
burden of proof becomes extremely difficult. 148 In Gavalik v. Continental
Can Co., the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that ERISA cases require
proof of a specific intent to discriminate or interfere with a benefit
right. 14 9 The court added that circumstantial evidence may be used to
138. 991 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1993).
139. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
140. Carl A. Greci, Note, Use It and Lose It: The Employer's Absolute Right UnderERISA Section
510 to Engage in Post-Claim Modifications of Employee Welfare Benefit Plans, 68 IND. L.J. 177, 179

(1992).
insured
141.
142.

ERISA applies to benefit plans financed through the employer's own assets (selfbenefits), not to commercial insurance benefits. See id. at 177-78.
Id. at 179, 181; see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)-(2) (1988).
Arthur S. Leonard, Ethical Challenges of H1VInfection in the Workplace, 5 NOTRE DAME J.

L. ETics & PUB. POL'y 53, 63 (1990).

143. Joan Vogel, ContainingMedical and Disability Costs by Cutting Unhealthy Employees: Does
Section 510 of ERISA Provide a Remedy?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1024, 1041-42 (1987). ERISA
§ 510 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or
discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he
is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan ... or for the purpose
of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan ....
29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988).
144. See Vogel, supra note 143, at 1042.
145. Greci, supra note 140, at 184-85.
146. See Phelps v. Field Real Estate Co., 991 F.2d 645, 645 (10th Cir. 1993).
147. Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 852 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 979
(1987); Greci, supra note 140, at 185.
148. Vogel, supra note 143, at 1042.
149. Gravalik, 812 F.2d at 851-52.
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show specific intent. 150 In Conkwright v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,15 1 the
court ruled that an employee claiming discriminatory discharge on the
probably than not motivated
basis of his age must prove that his age15more
2
the employer's decision to discharge.
Phelps involved allegations of such unlawful discharge based on the
employee's development of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS). 15 3 AIDS costs both money and lives. The enormous health care
costs associated with AIDS invite employers to target and discriminate
against employees or potential employees who either have AIDS, have
tested positive for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) 15 4 infection, or
present a high risk of contracting the virus. 155 Before Phelps, no case law
existed directly addressing ERISA's protection against discriminatory disunder
charge of an employee with AIDS.1 56 Courts have granted relief
157
ERISA, however, to employees discharged for other illnesses.
B.

Tenth Circuit Opinion: Phelps v. Field Real Estate Co.
1.

Facts

Field Real Estate Company (Field) hired John Phelps as vice-president of commercial real estate in 1985.158 Almost two years later, Phelps
tested positive for HIV; however, he exhibited no symptoms or illness. 159
Because his HIV status did not affect his ability to work, Phelps decided
not to disclose his condition.1' °
The chief executive officer of Field, Douglas Poole, evaluated Phelps'
performance annually. 161 On a scale of one to five, Phelps received primarily threes on his 1986 evaluation. 162 In 1987, Phelps was promoted to
senior vice-president, and in his 1987 performance evaluation, he received
163
primarily fours.
In 1988, Poole received an anonymous note stating that Phelps had a
fatal blood disease, and asking that he be transferred. 164 When con150. Id.; see also Dister v. Continental Group, Inc.,'859 F.2d 1108, 1112 (2d Cir. 1988)

(stating that specific intent in ERISA claims can rarely be shown by direct evidence).
151. 933 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1991).
152. Id. at 235.
153. Phelps, 991 F.2d 645.
154. HIV is the virus that causes AIDS. THE SLOANE-DoRTAND ANNOTATED MEDIc.&L-LEGAL
DIcrIoNARY 497 (1992 Supp.).

155.

See Vogel, supra note 143, at 1031, 1061.

156.

See Leonard, supra note 142, at 65. Cf McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401

(5th Cir. 1991) (affirming an employer's absolute right to significantly reduce the maximum
lifetime benefit for AIDS-related claims).
157. See Arthur S. Leonard, AIDS, Employment and Unemployment 49 OHIo ST. LJ. 929, 95052 (1989); see, e.g., Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (awarding
equitable relief under ERISA to an employee fired after revealing that he had multiple
sclerosis).
158.

Phelps v. Field Real Estate Co., 991 F.2d 645, 646-47 (10th Cir. 1993).

159. Id. at 647.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162.

Id.

163. Id. at 647.
164. Id.
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fronted, Phelps admitted that his condition was fatal and that he kept it
confidential for fear of losing his job and health insurance. 165 Poole reassured Phelps; however, Poole expressed concern about the effects of
Phelps' condition on corporate liability and the acquisition of "key man"
insurance for Phelps if Field were sold. 16 6 At Poole's request, Phelps produced a letter signed by a physician stating that Phelps' condition could
adversely affect his insurability but that his condition did not presently
affect his job performance. 167 Phelps still did not reveal the true nature of
his condition. 168 Phelps gave the letter to Poole, who expressed confi1 69
dence in Phelps' working capabilities.
Later in 1988, Poole advertised for a commercial real estate division
manager, describing a position similar to Phelps' job. 170 In early 1989,
Phelps received all fours on his evaluation, but a performance comment
stated that commercial sales growth had been poor. 17 1 Phelps responded
that outside factors including a poor economy stunted the division's
1 72
growth.
In August 1989, a memo leaked regarding changes in the commercial
1 73
division and the hiring of a new general manager of sales and leasing.
Two days later, Field discharged Phelps; the reasons given were the division's poor performance and the company's reorganization.1 74 At that
time, Phelps revealed that he had AIDS and that discharging him would
terminate his health insurance benefits.1 75 Poole stated that he was not
aware Phelps had AIDS and offered him a position as a real estate agent
176
with the option of continuing his health insurance at his own expense.
Phelps rejected the offer and filed suit against Field, claiming violations
177
under § 510 of ERISA.
The district court found that Poole did know the true nature of
178
Phelps' illness but that Phelps failed to prove a discriminatory motive.
1 79
Phelps' personal representative appealed,
and the Tenth Circuit
affirmed. 180
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 647-48.
168. Id. at 648 n.4.
169. Id. at 648.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Phelps, 991 F.2d at 648.
174. Id. at 649.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 646. This survey does not discuss Phelps' second claim alleging discrimination
against employees with handicaps under COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-34-402(1)(a) (1988). See
Phelps, 991 F.2d at 650.
178. Phelps, 991 F.2d at 649-50.
179. Id. at 646 n.I. John Phelps died in 1992 before his case was heard on appeal. Id.
180. Id. at 651.
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Opinion

Phelps' ERISA claim required the Tenth Circuit to determine
whether the evidence suggested that Field based any part of its decision to
discharge Phelps on saving expected benefit costs. 1 8 ' The court applied
the rule from Conkwright v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,' 8 2 requiring Phelps
to show that his medical condition, more probably than not, motivated his
employer to fire him. 18 3 The court also applied the rules from Gavalik v.
Continental Can Co., 184 and Dister v. Continental Group, Inc.,18 5 stating that
Phelps could prove his claim by using circumstantial evidence because direct evidence of an improper motive is rare. 18 6 After briefly analyzing the
district court's findings of fact; the court found that Phelps failed to show
any prohibited intent on the part of his employer. 187 The court based its
decision on the following facts: (1) Field discharged Phelps fourteen
months after he revealed his illness; (2) the commercial sales division
under Phelps did not meet growth expectations; (3) Field completely reorganized its commercial sales and leasing division; (4) at the time of
Phelps' discharge, Field warned another employee who headed the commercial leasing division that his job was limited; and (5) the other employee left the company soon after the reorganization.' 188
C.

Analysis

Phelps exposes a variety of troubling contemporary ethical and legal
issues. The court's decision itself is disturbing. The Tenth Circuit applied
the conventional rules concerning discriminatory discharge under § 510
of ERISA but engaged in a rather dubious factual analysis. The court
seemed to slide by some very important facts in reaching its decision that
strongly suggested improper motive. First, the court agreed that evidence
existed to show the possible adverse effect an employee with AIDS might
have on health benefits.' 8 9 The district court found and the Tenth Circuit
accepted the fact that Poole, Phelps' supervisor, knew or at least suspected
that Phelps had AIDS, even though the facts also showed that Poole expressed surprise when Phelps revealed his true illness. 190 The facts show
that Poole expressed concern about the effects of Phelps' illness on corporate liability and securing "key man" insurance. 9 1 Phelps' performance
evaluations continually improved; in fact, his last evaluation contained all
fours, yet Field discharged Phelps for his past performance.' 92 Field fired
181. See id. at 649.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
1991).
191.
192.

933 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1991).
See id. at 235.
812 F.2d 834 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,484 U.S. 979 (1987).
859 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1988).
See Phelps, 991 F.2d at 645; Dister, 859 F.2d at 1112; Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 852.
See Phelps, 991 F.2d at 650.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 649; see Phelps v. Field Real Estate Co., 793 F. Supp. 1535, 1540-41 (D. Colo.
Phelps, 991 F.2d at 647.
See id. at 647-49.
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Phelps without warning and without instituting a probationary employment period. 19 3 In light of the fact that Phelps' coworker received a warning, 194 the preceding fact becomes even more relevant. Finally, when
Phelps revealed his illness, his employer offered him a demotion so that
he could continue his health insurance at his own expense.195 The last fact
strongly suggests that Phelps' employer had considered the potential effects that Phelps' illness would have on the benefit program. Hence, circumstantial evidence of the employer's improper motive abounds.
The court should have weighted the above facts more heavily, especially given that an employer can rebut the accusation by merely presenting a legitimate reason for the discharge. 196 Apparently the division
under Phelps really did experience sluggish growth. However, evidence of
contributing economic factors also existed. Because AIDS not only generates costly medical expenses but also carries one of the worst stigmas of
modern times, it seems highly possible, if not probable, that Phelps would
not have lost his job if his employer had not known Phelps had AIDS.
Unfortunately, the AIDS epidemic continues with no certain cure or
treatment in sight. Because of early detection tests and medications that
delay symptoms, people known to have HIV infection live and function
longer with the disease. 19 7 Therefore, infected persons without symptoms
or illness will continue to appear in the workplace. The high costs of medical care, the availability of early detection, and perhaps lingering
infected employprejudices provide incentives to the employer to identify 198
ees or potential employees. This invites discrimination.
193. See id. at 649.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id. at 650. Motive may be masked by a legitimate discharge reason. See Vogel,
supra note 143, at 1031, 1061.
197. See Leonard, supra note 142, at 53-54.
198. Although Colorado's amendment to its constitution (popularly known as Amendment 2), COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30(b) (Supp. 1993), is beyond the scope of this article, it
does merit some attention. Amendment 2 prevents the State of Colorado and any of its cities
or towns from passing laws that prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. Amendment 2 provides:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation.
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any
of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact,
adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance, or policy whereby homosexual,
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute
or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim
any minority status quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.
This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
Id. This type of constitutional provision simply exacerbates the problem. If such laws and
ordinances are prohibited, then employers may skip the step of trying to determine whether
a person has AIDS and eliminate homosexuals as a class because they (specifically homosexual males) represent a high-risk group. See Leonard, supra note 157, at 956-57.
In December 1993, the Denver District Court ruled that Amendment 2 is unconstitutional. Evans v. Romer, CIV.A. No. 92 CV 7223, 1993 WL 518586, at *9 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec.
14, 1993). However, this decision will probably be appealed, perhaps as high as the United
States Supreme Court. Thaddeus Herrick, Both Sides in Gay Bights Fight Claim Victory, RocKY
MTN. NEws, Dec. 15, 1993, at 8A. Until a final ruling of unconstitutionality is made by a
higher court, the specter of other similar laws and constitutional provisions looms ominously.
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High health care costs constitute the primary cause of health benefitbased discrimination. If expensive medical care costs are merely an unavoidable fact of life, however, then employers who provide health benefits
should expect, prepare, and provide for employees who get sick. Furthermore, the law should strictly enforce antidiscrimination laws to diminish
the incentive to discriminate against ill or potentially ill employees.
Otherwise, the newly proposed national health insurance program will be
the only other solution. 199 If soaring health care costs are contained, and
if everyone is guaranteed some level of health care by widely distributing
costs, then employers will have no reason to treat unhealthy employees
differently.
CONCLUSION

The three cases discussed in this Survey involve two larger issues: (1)
the right to quality health care and (2) the problem of high health care
costs. Delaney v. Cad 00 and EMTALA 20 1 concern a patient's right to receive the best available emergency medical treatment and the liability of
those who violate that right.20 2 Community Hospital v. Sullivan20 3 and the
Medicare Act 20 4 involve the financial protection of smaller, more rural
hospitals that may be the sole providers of medical care to their surrounding communities. Insuring quality health care to rural residents is the ultimate concern behind the protection of rural hospitals. In addition, the
situation in Community Hospital arises out of high hospital costs and the
20
20 5
Finally, Phelps v. Field Real Estate Co.
inability of many patients to pay.

6

20 7

and § 510 of ERISA
concern employees' rights to obtain quality health
care through employer-provided health benefits. Phelps also exhibits the
problems associated with high health care costs, and employees who re20 8
quire or potentially require extensive medical care.
The Tenth Circuit's decisions further shape and define citizens' legal
rights and obligations under the nation's health care system. The extent
to which these decisions will impact health law remains to be seen, especially considering the proposed national health insurance system. Even if
Congress eventually implements a new and radically different health care
system, court decisions such as those surveyed here expose current health
law issues and serve as guides to questions that will have to be addressed in
any reformation process.
A. Mark Isley

199.
200.
201.
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208.

See Greci, supra note 140, at 201-02; Leonard, supra note 157, at 963.
986 F.2d 387 (10th Cir. 1993).
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
See suprapart I.
986 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1993).
42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
See supra part II.
991 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1993).
29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988).
See supra part III.

